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1 Introduction
According to Che and Sakovics (2008), \hold-up arises when part of the return on an
agents relationship-specic investments is ex post expropriable by his trading part-
ner." With incomplete contract, which arises due to causes such as unforeseen contin-
gencies and inability of enforcement, relationship-specic investments are distorted
by the hold-up problem and are therefore insucient.
The current literature on hold-up (see the survey of Che and Sakovics 2008) mainly
focuses on the ineciency issue due to the hold-up problem and organizational or
contract remedies to achieve the rst best through some ex post renegotiation de-
sign. In their models, relationship-specic investments are usually simultaneously
invested. In contrast, we investigate hold-up with simultaneous and sequential in-
vestment and focus on the impact of sequential investment on ineciency issue of
underinvestment. We show that if the encouragement eect of sequential comple-
mentary investments dominates the delay eect, sequential investment alleviates the
underinvestment caused by the hold-up problem. Further, if it is allowed to choose
when to invest, strategic delay occurs when the encouragement eect of sequential
complementary investments dominates the delay eect.
More specically, there is a potentially protable relationship between two parties.
Some relationship-specic pre-investments from both sides are often involved, which
is a double moral-hazard problem in terms of Laont and Martimort (2002). The
two parties have to rely on bargaining to divide the surplus of investment through
the ex post renegotiation, since ex ante contracts are incomplete. With sequential
investment, the leader may have incentive to invest more to elicit more investment
from the follower { encouragement eect. Meanwhile, due to the delay of the
realization of the surplus of investment under sequential investment { delay eect,
sequential investment alleviates the underinvestment caused by the hold-up problem
if the encouragement eect dominates the delay eect. Further, if parties have the
option to choose when to invest, strategic delay occurs when the encouragement eect
dominates the delay eect.
Our model is close to Smironov and Wait (2004a, 2004b)'s sequential investment
model. Smirnov andWait (2004a, 2004b) provide a model to allow the exibility in the
timing of investment and show that the overall welfare may be detrimental due to the
cost of delay. In their alternative investment regime (sequential investment), renegoti-
ation occurs after the leader makes the relationship-specic investment and therefore
there is no role of encouragement eect of sequential complementary investments. In
contrast, in our model, contracting is impossible on both relationship-specic invest-
ments. Consequently, renegotiation will only occur after both relationship-specic
investments are sunk.
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Our model is also related to the literature on property rights theory.1 Noldeke
and Schmidt (1998) and Zhang and Zhang (2010) show that the underinvestment
caused by the hold-up problem still exists under the sequential investment setting.
Further, Zhang and Zhang (2010) show the alleviation of underinvestment under
sequential investment and the consequent impact of sequential investment on the
choice of ownership structure. In their model, there is no discount and hence there is
no role of delay eect.
Lastly, there is some literature on the dynamics of hold-up (see, for instance, Che
and Sakovics (2004)), which allows the parties to continue to invest until they agree
on the terms of trade. In contrast, we assume the relationship-specic investments
are a one-time irreversible choice. Even if parties can choose when to invest, they can
not alter the investment level once it has been sunk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the setup of
our basic model and shows that sequential investment alleviates the underinvestment
caused by the hold-up problem if the encouragement eect of sequential complemen-
tary investments dominates the delay eect. In section 3, it is allowed to choose
when to invest and we show that strategic delay occurs when the encouragement ef-
fect of sequential complementary investments dominates the delay eect. Section 4
concludes.
2 The Model
Follow the setup of Smironov and Wait (2004a, 2004b). There is a potentially prof-
itable relationship between two parties that, for convenience, we label as a buyer M1
and a seller M2. Specically, if the buyer and seller invest I1 and I2 respectively, the
two parties share surplus R(I1; I2).
Two alternative timing arrangements are considered. First, both players invest
simultaneously at date t = 1, as shown in Figure 1. At this stage, contracting on
either investment is not possible; consequently, renegotiation (or contracting) will
occur at date t = 2 after both investments are sunk. If there is an agreement, surplus
is realized and the payos to each party are made. Otherwise, if the renegotiation
breaks down, they will stay with their own non-trade payos, which are normalized
to zero.
Figure 2 illustrates the timing of the alternative investment regime. In this regime,
the buyerM1 invests I1 at date t = 1. After observingM1's investment, the sellerM2
1They assume ex ante parties could negotiate on the ownership structure (residual rights of con-
trol), which determines the status quo payos of the parties in the ex post renegotiation. And thus,
hold-up problem reduces through this organization remedy. In contrast, we assume ex ante con-
tracting is impossible on both relationship-specic investments. Hence, there is no role of ownership
structure in our model.
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Figure 1: Timing of Simultaneous Investment
invests I2 at date t = 2. At both of these two stages, contracting on either investment
is not possible;2 consequently, renegotiation (or contracting) will occur at date t = 3
after both investments are sunk. If there is an agreement, surplus is realized and the
payos to each party are made. Otherwise, if the renegotiation breaks down, they
will stay with their own non-trade payos, which are normalized to zero.
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Figure 2: Timing of Sequential Investment
Suppose both parties have the common discount factor  2 (0; 1]. In addition, we
make the following assumptions for R(I1; I2).
Assumption 1 R(I1; I2) is twice dierentiable, nondecreasing in both variables, and
strictly concave.
Assumption 2
@2R(I1; I2)
@I1@I2
 0
Assumption 1 is the usual assumption of the surplus function. Assumption 2
says that investments are complementary at the margin. Let  represent the ex post
bargaining weight of M1, where  2 (0; 1).
2In Smironov and Wait (2004a, 2004b), they assume once I1 has been made, I2 is contractible.
Therefore, in their models, renegotiation is in between I1 and I2 for the sequential investment. On
the contrary, we assume contracting on either investment is possible only if both investments are
sunk.
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2.1 The First-Best
In the rst-best, M1 and M2 maximize the date 1 present value of their trading
relationship, the ex ante surplus.3
max
I1;I2
R(I1; I2)  I1   I2
The rst order conditions are (
 @R(I1;I2)
@I1
= 1
 @R(I1;I2)
@I2
= 1
Let (I1 ; I

2 ) denote the solution of the maximization problem above.
2.2 Simultaneous Investment
At date 1, M1 and M2 maximize their own payos, net of investment costs.
max
I1
R(I1; I2)  I1
max
I2
(1  )R(I1; I2)  I2
The rst order conditions are (
 @R(I1;I2)
@I1
= 1
(1  ) @R(I1;I2)
@I2
= 1
Suppose (I1; I2) satises the rst order conditions above.
The following proposition shows that under simultaneous investment, there is
underinvestment in relationship-specic investments due to the hold-up problem.
Proposition 1 Under simultaneous investment, (I1; I2)  (I1 ; I2 ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The response functions and the equilibrium investment pairs under simultaneous
investment and at the rst-best are illustrated in Figure 3. Here, I1 (I2) is the response
function of I1 with respect to I2 under the rst best; I

2 (I1) is the response function
of I2 with respect to I1 under the rst best; I1(I2) is the response function of I1 with
respect to I2 under the simultaneous investment; I2(I1) is the response function of I2
with respect to I1 under the simultaneous investment.
3It takes one period for R(I1; I2) to be realized after both I1 and I2 are invested.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Investment Pairs under Simultaneous Investment
2.3 Sequential Investment
With sequential regime, M2 can observe the investment I1 from M1 before his in-
vestment. M1 chooses I1 at date 1. After observing M1's investment, M2 chooses
I2 at date 2. They maximize their own payos, net of investment costs.
With backward induction, at date 2, M2 chooses I2 given M1's choice I1 at date
1.
max
I2
(1  )R(I1; I2)  I2
s.t. I1 is some given constant
The rst order condition is
(1  )@R(I1; I2)
@I2
= 1 (1)
From the rst order condition above, we get the response function of M2.
I2 = I2(I1)
At date 1, M1 chooses I1 given the response function of M2 above.
max
I1
2R(I1; I2)  I1
s.t. I2 = I2(I1)
The rst order condition is
2
@R(I1; I2)
@I1
+ 2
@R(I1; I2)
@I2
dI2
dI1
= 1 (2)
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Suppose (I1; I2) satises the rst order condition above and the response function
I2 = I2(I1) of M2.
Since relationship-specic investments are complementary, the rst mover has in-
centive to invest more to encourage the follower to catch up { encouragement eect
a la Zhang and Zhang (2010). Further, with sequential regime, it takes one more pe-
riod for R(I1; I2) to be realized. We call this delay eect. The following proposition
shows that if the encouragement eect of sequential complementary investments dom-
inates the delay eect, sequential investment alleviates the underinvestment caused
by the hold-up problem. That is, if M1 and M2 are patient enough, both investment
levels will increase with sequential regime.
Proposition 2 There exists a b, such that if   b, (I1; I2)  (I1; I2).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Given some , the response functions and the equilibrium investment pairs un-
der sequential investment, under simultaneous investment, and at the rst-best are
illustrated in Figure 4. Here, I1(I2) is the response function of I1 with respect to I2
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Investment Pairs under Sequential Investment
under the sequential investment; I2(I1) is the response function of I2 with respect to
I1 under the sequential investment. With sequential regime, M2's response function
remains unchanged, while M1's response function curve could shift up or down de-
pending upon how large  is. Therefore, the equilibrium investment pairs will reach
some point on the M2's response function curve (the bold portion of I2(I1) in Figure
4).
Figure 5 illustrates the loci of the equilibrium investment pairs under sequential
investment, under simultaneous investment, and at the rst-best as  evolves from
0 to 1. As  close to zero, both I1 and I2 are close to zero for both sequential
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Figure 5: Equilibrium Investment Pairs under Sequential Investment
and simultaneous regimes, as well as at the rst-best. As  approaches to 1, the
encouragement eect of sequential investment dominates the delay eect.4 Therefore,
if  is suciently large, the equilibrium investment pairs I1 and I2 with sequential
regime are larger than those with simultaneous regime.5
2.4 Welfare Analysis
In proposition 2, we show that due to both the encouragement eect and the delay
eect, there will be more investments under sequential investment if M1 and M2 are
patient enough. The further question is whether more investments are better, or if
the ex ante surplus is increasing as I1 and I2 increase under sequential investment if
M1 and M2 are patient enough.
Let the ex ante surplus under the simultaneous regime S = R(I1; I2)   I1   I2;
the ex ante surplus under the simultaneous regime S = 2R(I1; I2)   I1   I2, the
ex ante surplus under the rst-best S = R(I1 ; I

2 )  I1   I2 . The following lemma
shows that S, S, and S are monotonically increasing as  evolves from 0 to 1.
Lemma 1 S, S, and S are increasing in .
Proof. See the Appendix.
4Zhang and Zhang (2010) show this for the case  = 1.
5We may not have the the single crossing of the loci of the equilibrium investment pairs under
sequential investment and under simultaneous investment as  evolves from 0 to 1. However, if the
encouragement eect is non-decreasing in , there exists the single crossing as illustrated in gure 5.
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The following proposition shows that if the encouragement eect dominates the
delay eect, then the sequential regime will be better than the simultaneous regime
in terms of larger ex ante surplus.
Proposition 3
i) If (I1; I2)  (I1; I2), then S  S.
ii) There exists a e  b, such that if   e, S  S.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, with the same or lower level of investments, the sequential regime is
worse than the simultaneous regime, due to the delay of the realization of R(I1; I2)
under sequential regime. Moreover, from proposition 2, if   b, there will be more
investment under sequential regime. But this can not guarantee that the ex ante
surplus is larger, due to the delay under sequential regime. Similar to Zhang and
Zhang (2010) proposition 3, we have S  S if  = 1. Therefore, we can always nd ae  b, such that if   e, S  S.
3 Strategic Delay
3.1 Strategic Delay { One-sided
Suppose now M2 has the option when to invest. In this case, both simultaneous and
sequential regime are possible. M1 invests I1 at date t = 1; M2 can choose either
to invest I2 at date t = 1 or to wait till date t = 2 when M1's investment has been
sunk.
The following proposition shows that M2 has incentive to delay if the encourage-
ment eect of sequential complementary investments dominates the delay eect.
Proposition 4
i) If (I1; I2)  (I1; I2), then M2 does not have incentive to delay.
ii) There exists a
bb  b, such that if   bb, M2 will wait till date t = 2 to invest.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, if the encouragement eect of sequential complementary investments
is dominated by the delay eect such that (I1; I2)  (I1; I2), M2 does not have
incentive to delay. Further, if  is close to one, the encouragement eect of sequential
complementary investments dominates the delay eect andM2 has incentive to delay.
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3.2 Strategic Delay { Two-sided
Suppose now both M1 and M2 have the option when to invest. In this case, if one
party invests at date t, then the other party will invest at date t + 1, as there is no
gain to delay further once the leader's investment has been sunk. The question now
is who will initial the investment or both invest at date t = 1.
The following proposition shows that if the encouragement eect of sequential
complementary investments is dominated by the delay eect, both M1 and M2 do
not have incentive to delay. Further, if M1 and M2 are patient enough, the game
becomes an anti-coordination game.
Proposition 5
i) If (I1; I2)  (I1; I2) and (I1; I2)  (I1; I2), then both M1 and M2 will invest at
date t = 1.6
ii) There exists a
ee  b, such that if   ee, the game becomes an anti-coordination
game. There are three possible equilibria:
(1) M1 invests at date t = 1, followed by M2 investing at date t = 2;
(2) M2 invests at date t = 1, followed by M1 investing at date t = 2;
(3) M1 and M2 invest at date t = 1 with probability (p; q), where p; q 2
(0; 1); for any date t > 1, if no one has invested before, M1 and M2 invest
at date t with probability (p; q).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, if the encouragement eect of sequential complementary investments
is dominated by the delay eect such that (I1; I2)  (I1; I2) and (I1; I2)  (I1; I2),
both M1 and M2 do not have incentive to delay. Further, if  is close to one, the
encouragement eect of sequential complementary investments dominates the delay
eect. The benet from sequential regime is so large thatM1 andM2 end up with an
anti-coordination game: if one waits, it is better for the other to invest immediately.
4 Conclusion
We investigate hold-up with simultaneous and sequential investment and focus on the
impact of sequential investment on ineciency issue of underinvestment. We show
6Here, by a slight abuse of notation, for sequential regime, denote the equilibrium investment
pairs when M2 is the leader as (I1; I2), which is dierent from the equilibrium investment pair
(I1; I2) when M1 is the leader.
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that if the encouragement eect of sequential complementary investments dominates
the delay eect, sequential investment alleviates the underinvestment caused by the
hold-up problem. Further, if it is allowed to choose when to invest, strategic de-
lay occurs when the encouragement eect of sequential complementary investments
dominates the delay eect.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Let x = (I1; I2). Similar to the proof of proposition 1 in Hart
and Moore (1990) and proposition 1 in Zhang and Zhang (2010), dene g(x) = R(I1; I2) 
I1   I2 and h(x) such that
rg(x) =
 
 @R(I1;I2)@I1   1
 @R(I1;I2)@I2   1
!
rh(x) =
 
 @R(I1;I2)@I1   1
(1  ) @R(I1;I2)@I2   1
!
From the rst order conditions in section 2.1 and 2.2, we have
rg(x)
x=(I1 ;I

2 )
= 0
rh(x)
x=(I1;I2)
= 0
From assumption 1, we haverg(x)  rh(x) for any investments I1; I2. Dene f(x; ) =
g(x) + (1  )h(x). Also dene x() = (i(); e()) to solve rf(x; ) = 0. Total dierenti-
ating, we obtain
H(x; )dx() =  [rg(x) rh(x)]d
where H(x; ) is the Hessian of f(x; ) with respect to x. From assumption 1 and 2,
H(x; ) is negative denite. Also, from assumption 2, the o-diagonal elements of H(x; )
are non-negative. From Takayama (1985), p.393, theorem 4.D.3 [III"] and [IV"], H(x; ) 1
is nonpositive. Therefore, dx()=d  0, and x(1)  x(0), which implies I1  I1 and
I2  I2 .
Proof of Proposition 2 With backward induction, at date 2, M2 maximizes his own
payos, net of investment costs, by choosing I2 given M1's choice I1 at date 1:1. Total
dierentiating the rst order condition (equation 4), we obtain
(1  )@
2R(I1; I2)
@I22
dI2 + (1  )@
2R(I1; I2)
@I2@I1
dI1 = 0
Rearranging and from assumption 1 and 2, we have
dI2
dI1
=  
@2R(I1;I2)
@I2@I1
@2R(I1;I2)
@I22
 0
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Similar to the proof of proposition 1, let x = (I1; I2). From equation 4 and 2, dene
h(x) and l(x) such that
rh(x) =
 
 @R(I1;I2)@I1   1
(1  ) @R(I1;I2)@I2   1
!
rl(x) =
 
2 @R(I1;I2)@I1 + 
2 @R(I1;I2)
@I2
dI2
dI1
  1
(1  ) @R(I1;I2)@I2   1
!
From the rst order conditions in section 2.2 and 2.3, we have
rh(x)
x=(I1;I2)
= 0
rl(x)
x=(I1;I2)
= 0
From the rst order conditions in section 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, there exist corresponding
unique investment pairs (I1 ; I2 ), (I1; I2), and (I1; I2), for any given . Same logic as the
proof in proposition 1, (I1 ; I2 ), (I1; I2), and (I1; I2) are increasing as  increases.
If  is close to zero, all investments will be close to zero because it takes one period
for R(I1; I2) to be realized after both I1 and I2 are invested. Further, if  = 1, we have
rl(x)  rh(x) for any investments I1; I2 since dI2dI1  0. That is, for  = 1
2
@R(I1; I2)
@I1
+ 2
@R(I1; I2)
@I2
dI2
dI1
 @R(I1; I2)
@I1
Same logic as the proof of proposition 1, we have I1  I1 and I2  I2. Since all functions
are continuous and dierentiable, we can always nd a b, such that if   b, I1  I1 and
I2  I2.
Proof of Lemma 1 Total dierentiating the ex ante surplus under the rst-best S =
R(I1 ; I2 )  I1   I2 ,
dS = R(I1 ; I

2 )d +


@R(I1 ; I2 )
@I1
  1

dI1 +


@R(I1 ; I2 )
@I2
  1

dI2
From the rst order conditions in section 2.1, we have
dS
d
= R(I1 ; I

2 )  0
Similarly, total dierentiating the ex ante surplus under the simultaneous regime S =
R(I1; I2)  I1   I2,
dS = R(I1; I2)d +


@R(I1; I2)
@I1
  1

dI1 +


@R(I1; I2)
@I2
  1

dI2
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From the rst order conditions in section 2.2, we have
dS
d
= R(I1; I2) +

1

  1

dI1
d
+

1
1     1

dI2
d
 0
Here, (I1; I2) are increasing in  from From proposition 2.
Same logic, total dierentiating the ex ante surplus under the sequential regime S =
2R(I1; I2)  I1   I2,
dS =

2R(I1; I2)  I2

d +

2
@R(I1; I2)
@I1
  1

dI1 + 


@R(I1; I2)
@I2
  1

dI2
From the rst order conditions under sequential investment in section 2.3, we have
dI2
dI1
=
1  2 @R(I1;I2)
@I1
2 @R(I1;I2)
@I2
=
1  2 @R(I1;I2)
@I1

h
 @R(I1;I2)
@I2
  1
i  1  2 @R(I1;I2)@I1

h
 @R(I1;I2)
@I2
  1
i
which implies 
2
@R(I1; I2)
@I1
  1

dI1 + 


@R(I1; I2)
@I2
  1

dI2  0
Here,



@R(I1; I2)
@I2
  1

= 

1
1     1

> 0
In addition, 2R(I1; I2) I2  R(I1; I2) I2  (R(I1; I2) I2)  2R(I1; I2) I2 I1  0,
as the ex ante surplus is non-negative. Therefore, we have dSd  0.
Proof of Proposition 3
i) With the same level of investment, S  S, as [R(I1; I2) I1 I2]  [2R(I1; I2) I1 
I2] = (1   )[R(I1; I2)   I2]  0. Here, [R(I1; I2)   I2]  0 to ensure a non-negative ex
ante surplus. In addition, S and S are increasing in  from lemma 1. Therefore, if I1  I1
and I2  I2, then S = 2R(I1; I2) I1 I2  R(I1; I2) I1 I2  R(I1; I2) I1 I2 = S.
ii) From lemma 1, S and S are monotonically increasing as  evolves from 0 to 1.
Moreover, from part i) of this proposition, with the same or lower level of investments, the
sequential regime is worse than the simultaneous regime. Further, similar to Zhang and
Zhang (2010) proposition 3, we can show that S  S if  = 1. Finally, all functions are
continuous and dierentiable. Therefore, we can always nd a e  b, such that if   e,
S  S.
Proof of Proposition 4
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i) At date t = 1, M2 has the option when to invest. The present value of payo for M2
to invest at date t = 1, net of investment cost, is
S2 = (1  )R(I1; I2)  I2
The present value of payo for M2 to wait till date t = 2, net of investment cost, is
F2 = (1  )2R(I1; I2)  I2
Total dierentiating (1  )R(I1; I2)  I2,
d[(1  )R(I1; I2)  I2] = (1  ) @R(I1; I2)
@I1
dI1 +

(1  ) @R(I1; I2)
@I2
  1

dI2
From the rst order conditions in section 2.2 and 2.3, we have
(1  ) @R(I1; I2)
@I2
= 1
which implies (1  )R(I1; I2)  I2 is increasing in I1 and I2.
Therefore, if I1  I1 and I2  I2,
F2 = (1  )2R(I1; I2)  I2 = 

(1  )R(I1; I2)  I2

  (1  )R(I1; I2)  I2
 (1  )R(I1; I2)  I2 = S2
That is to say, M2 does not have incentive to delay.
ii) If  = 1, from proposition 2, we have I1  I1 and I2  I2. From part i) of this
proposition, (1  )R(I1; I2)  I2 is increasing in I1 and I2. In this case,
F2 = (1  )R(I1; I2)  I2  (1  )R(I1; I2)  I2 = S2
Therefore, M2 will wait till date t = 2 to invest I2. Finally, all functions are continuous
and dierentiable. Therefore, we can always nd a
bb  b, such that if   bb, M2 will wait
till date t = 2 to invest I2.
Proof of Proposition 5
i) Similar to the proof of part i) of proposition 4, let us see the best response of M2 if
M1 invests at date t = 1. The present value of payo for M2 to invest at date t = 1, net
of investment cost, is
S2 = (1  )R(I1; I2)  I2
The present value of payo for M2 to wait till date t = 2, net of investment cost, is
F2 = (1  )2R(I1; I2)  I2
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Similar to the proof in part i) of proposition 4, if (I1; I2)  (I1; I2), F2  S2 . That is to
say, if M1 invests at date t = 1, M2's best response is to invest at date t = 1.
Further, let us see the best response of M2 if M1 waits at date t = 1. The present value
of payo for M2 to invest at date t = 1, net of investment cost, is
L2 = (1  )2R(I1; I2)  I2
Similar to the proof in part i) of proposition 4, if (I1; I2)  (I1; I2), L2  S2 .
The present value of payo for M2 to wait till date t = 2, net of investment cost, is
the continuation payo when both M1 and M2 wait at date t = 1, denoted as X2. The
following table illustrates the payo matrix at date t = 1 for M1 and M2.7
M2
Invest Wait
M1
Invest S1 ; 
S
2 
L
1 ; 
F
2
Wait F1 ; 
L
2 X1; X2
Clearly, both M1 and M2 wait at date t = 1 is not an equilibrium, as at date t = 2 they
are facing the same game as date t = 1 game. If it is optimal for both M1 and M2 waiting
at date t = 1, then it is also optimal for both M1 and M2 waiting at date t = 2. Same
logic applies to any future period, and the continuation payo X1 = X2 = 0. Therefore,
if M1 waits at date t = 1, the best response for M2 is to invest at date t = 1 with some
probability q 2 (0; 1], in which X2  L2 .
Same reasoning applies to M1 and we have F1  S1 , L1  S1 , and X1  L1 . If M2
invests at date t = 1 with some probability q 2 (0; 1), then X1 is some convex combination
of F1 , 
S
1 , 
L
1 , and X1 itself, multiplying the discount factor. If  < 1, X1 < 
L
1 , and also
X2 < 
L
2 . In this case, there exists an unique equilibrium such that bothM1 andM2 invest
at date t = 1.
If  = 1, we could have the equilibrium such that M1 and/or M2 invest at date t = 1
with some probability in between (0; 1). Still, investing at date t = 1 is a weakly dominant
strategy for both M1 and M2.
ii) Similar to the proof in part ii) of proposition 4, if  = 1, from proposition 2, we
have (I1; I2)  (I1; I2). Analogously, (I1; I2)  (I1; I2). Similar to the proof of part i) of
this proposition, we have L1  S1 , F1  S1 , L2  S2 , and F2  S2 . For the continuation
payo, X1  L1 and X2  L2 .
Therefore, the game becomes an anti-coordination game. There are three possible equi-
libria:
(1) M1 invests at date t = 1, followed by M2 investing at date t = 2;
7S1 , 
L
1 , 
F
1 , and X1, the net payos for M1, are the counterparts of 
S
2 , 
L
2 , 
F
2 , and X2.
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(2) M2 invests at date t = 1, followed by M1 investing at date t = 2;
(3) M1 and M2 invest at date t = 1 with probability (p; q), where p; q 2 (0; 1); for any
date t > 1, if no one has invested before, M1 andM2 invest at date t with probability
(p; q).
Finally, all functions are continuous and dierentiable. Therefore, we can always nd aee  b, such that if   ee, the game becomes an anti-coordination game.
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